On 18 August 2026, Stipendiary Magistrate Charles Bonfante convicted me under Section 11(1)(b) of Gibraltar’s Terrorism Act 2018. I had been arrested on 10 September 2025, concerning my actions against The Palestinian Genocide. The sentencing hearing date is set for 8 September 2026. An explanation and the Mitigation Letter follows.
Stipendiary Magistrate Bonfante,
I write this letter ahead of sentencing to set out my position plainly. I state at the outset, without qualification, that I feel no remorse whatsoever for my actions on National Day 2025. My conduct was a deliberate act of conscience in response to mass civilian slaughter. I will not apologise for opposing genocide, nor will I pretend that my moral position has shifted simply because I now stand convicted.
My action on National Day was taken in direct opposition to the treatment of the suspended GHA nurse, who herself was deeply affected by the suffering of the Palestinian people trapped in the rubble of Gaza, under Israeli Defence Force bombardment. Her suspension was a punitive response to her humanitarian concern. My act was a principled stand in solidarity with her, and in defence of the right of Gibraltar’s citizens — including its healthcare workers — to express compassion for victims of mass violence without fear of professional or criminal sanction.
This case does not exist in isolation. Across the UK, individuals who have spoken out against the mass killing of civilians in Gaza have been prosecuted under unlawful terrorism legislation. The case of Tony Greenstein, as documented by journalist Jonathan Cook, illustrates the wider pattern: “The British state has lost the argument, even as it rigs the trials of genocide opponents. The UK isn’t a dispassionate arbiter of justice in prosecuting antigenocide activists. It has been aggressively colluding in Israeli crimes. That huge conflict of interest is the elephant in the room.”
These concerns form part of a broader discussion about British complicity in the events in Gaza, now the subject of a public inquiry known as the Gaza Tribunal. The Tribunal examines Britain’s political, military and logistical support for Israeli operations, and whether that support has contributed to violations of international humanitarian law. Senior public figures, including former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, have repeatedly called for transparency and accountability in the UK’s role, emphasising that humanitarian dissent should not be treated as extremism. This wider context illustrates how counter‑terrorism powers are increasingly being applied to peaceful political expression, and provides essential background for understanding the approach taken in my own case.
A clear example is the recent arrest of Sir Jonathon Porritt – a long‑standing public figure and former chair of the UK Sustainable Development Commission – who was detained outside Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 30 July 2026 for expressing support for Palestine Action following its proscription. His arrest formed part of a wider police operation in which more than one hundred people were detained under Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for the same expression‑based conduct. The incident attracted measured public commentary noting concerns about the proportionality of using terrorism legislation in circumstances involving peaceful protest. No charge has been publicly reported, and there is no record of any subsequent court proceedings. The relevance here is straightforward: my own conviction under Section 11(1)(b) reflects the same trend in which humanitarian dissent is increasingly reframed as extremism, and where political expression is treated as a matter for counter‑terrorism powers rather than ordinary civic discourse.
This development mirrors a wider shift in how counter‑terrorism powers are being applied to peaceful political expression. Across the UK, individuals have been arrested or prosecuted for non‑violent statements opposing the mass killing of civilians in Gaza, often in circumstances where context, intent, and explicit condemnations of violence were disregarded. These cases demonstrate how expression‑based offences are increasingly being interpreted in isolation from the broader humanitarian concerns that motivated the speech. That same interpretive approach is visible in the reasoning applied to my own case.
By convicting me under Section 11(1)(b) of the unlawful and unconstitutional Terrorism Act 2018, Gibraltar has now placed itself within that same framework. My prosecution cannot be separated from the political climate in which humanitarian dissent is being reframed as extremism. The charge against me was not based on any act that harmed anyone, or on any intent to support violence. It was therefore the display, however tiny, of a single solitary sentence — one amongst many — and the only sentence used to justify the charge against me, and on an interpretation that ignored every contextual statement I made, including my explicit condemnation of genocide.
The statistical comparison between the UK and Gibraltar since the unlawful proscription of organisations such as Palestine Action is stark. In the UK, hundreds have been arrested or investigated under unlawful terrorism legislation for symbolic or expressive acts connected to Palestine. Gibraltar, by contrast, has had no comparable history of such prosecutions — until now. Less than one per cent of the 3,000+ arrests in the UK have led to convictions. The contrast with Gibraltar’s 100% following your juryless ruling could hardly be more stark. This case could become infamous, and I intend to ensure that its implications are fully understood in the public record.
My concerns about the way terrorism and related unlawful coercive powers are now being deployed against those who speak out on Palestine are not isolated. They are shared by respected figures within the legal profession. One such individual is Rajiv Menon KC, who first came to my attention — impressively — during the Hillsborough Inquests, where he represented bereaved families with exceptional courage and clarity. More recently, he represented defendants in a highprofile Palestine Action jury trial, during which he clashed with the presiding judge. That clash has now resulted in an ongoing contempt of court prosecution against him. I applaud his actions. His willingness to confront judicial discomfort when the subject is Palestine, and his public warnings about the “chilling” effect created when courts use unlawful coercive powers to suppress humanitarian dissent, resonate directly with what has occurred in my own case. The themes are identical: opposition to Israeli mass violence reframed as extremism, conscience recast as criminality, and legislation stretched far beyond its intended purpose. It is for this reason that I intend to seek his advice in relation to my appeal.
I must also place on record the aggressive threats I have received since my arrest. A local individual — a drug-addicted thug who claims to be part of the “Hassans Dynasty” and alleges a familial connection to Sir Joshua Hassan — has repeatedly issued threats of violence against me. These threats have been direct, sustained, and clearly intended to intimidate me because of my political stance. I have reported these matters, but they form part of the wider context in which this case has unfolded: a climate where dissent is not only criminalised, but met with hostility from individuals who believe themselves protected by social or familial status.
My actions on National Day were taken, once again, for the long-term welfare of the people of Gibraltar. Many of whom support the Palestinians, and are disgusted with the Israeli’s genocide of Palestinians, that the unlawful legislation used in my case is being applied to suppress opposition to Israeli genocidal practice.
This is not a retrospective claim. In a previous judgment you delivered after the separate incident in Parliament — an incident that occurred prior to National Day 2025 — you stated that you had “no doubt whatsoever” that I believed I was acting in Gibraltar’s best interests. That assessment of my motives was your own, and it remains true here. The underlying intention has not changed; what has changed is the legislative environment, which now recasts political expression as criminality. By extending that same unlawful legislative framework to Gibraltar and applying it in this case, your decision has now placed this jurisdiction within that same chain of complicity in genocide.
During the trial, I was not alone in observing moments, where your own physiology appeared to betray discomfort with the position in which the unlawful and unconstitutional legislation placed you. I recognise that it is not within your gift to undo the conviction; that die has already been cast. The only remaining question is the proportionality of sentence. In the circumstances, the least hostile outcome available to the court would be an unconditional discharge. I am aware that such a decision would require courage, given the political climate surrounding this unlawful and unconstitutional legislation, but it would also acknowledge the reality that my conduct caused no harm and carried no intent to support violence.
I also place on record that, irrespective of whatever sentence is imposed, an appeal against the conviction will be lodged in the Supreme Court. That decision is already made. My attendance on 8 September will discharge my only voluntary obligation to this court. The wider issues raised by this conviction require appellate scrutiny, and that process will proceed irrespective of the penalty. The appeal will address the deeper constitutional concern: that the unlawful legislation used in my case is being applied to suppress opposition to Israeli genocidal practice, a reality documented by international legal bodies, human rights organisations, and independent journalists. The British state’s complicity in those practices is already a matter of public record. By extending that same legislative framework to Gibraltar and applying it in this case, your decision has now placed this jurisdiction within that same chain of complicity in genocide. It is precisely for that reason that the conviction must not be allowed to stand, and, if it does, it must be examined by the Supreme Court, and if the Supreme Court doesn’t overturn it, by the Appeal Court, etc., etc.
Despite all this, I have conducted myself respectfully throughout these proceedings. I have complied with every requirement placed upon me. My lack of remorse is not defiance; it is honesty. I cannot and will not express regret for standing against mass civilian slaughter. To do so would be a betrayal of conscience.
Whatever sentence you impose, I will continue to oppose genocide and to speak out against injustice. That is not extremism. It is a moral obligation.
Anthony Farrell
Gibraltar